The practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives. Our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively a!ect initial incentives, resetting can still be an important, value-enhancing aspect of compensation contracts, even from an ex-ante standpoint. In fact, we "nd that some resetting is almost always optimal. The relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to in#uence the resetting process, greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance, and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers.
Introduction
In recent years, stock options have become an important component of overall executive compensation. For such options to serve as a credible incentive See, e.g., &If the Price isn't Right, Just Change It' by David Johnston, New York Times, July 15, 1998; or &Lowering the Bar' by Joann Lublin, Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1999 .
The amendment proposes that repriced options be classi"ed as variable-strike rather than "xed-strike options. This would require companies to record depth-in-the-money at exercise time as compensation expense, rather than depth-in-the-money at award time. (The latter amount is typically zero since most new options are awarded at the money.) For more on the accounting treatment of options, see APB Opinion No. 25 (1972) (Accounting Principles Board) , and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (1995) of FASB. device, one might believe that the terms of the original contract should not be amended, especially when declining share prices have pushed the options out of the money. Nonetheless, considerable evidence suggests that such &resetting' does take place, typically in the form of a reduction in the original exercise price to bring the options closer to the money. Reaction to this practice has been almost uniformly negative. Heavy criticism has come from the "nancial press and from large institutional investors such as the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, who suggest that resetting is tantamount to rewarding management for poor performance and that, more importantly, it destroys incentives present in the original contract. Weighing in, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board has recently proposed an amendment to current accounting rules that is aimed at increasing reported expenses for companies that reprice previously awarded options.
The optimality and incentive e!ects of resetting have not, thus far, been addressed in an equilibrium contracting model in the theoretical literature on managerial compensation. This is somewhat surprising since resetting has been the theme of a number of recent empirical studies. Our paper is aimed at "lling this gap. We develop a model for analysis of this subject and examine the extent to which the arguments against resetting are justi"ed. Our main conclusion is simply stated: although the anticipation of resetting can have a substantial negative e!ect on initial incentives, resetting can nonethless be an important, value-enhancing aspect of corporate compensation contracts, even from an ex-ante standpoint. Indeed, we "nd that some resetting is almost always optimal. Our analysis calls into question the basis for much of the criticism of resetting.
Our model builds on the usual agency setting in which the "rm's shareholders (collectively called the &principal') provide an e!ort-averse manager (the &agent') with long-term incentives in the form of call options on the "rm's equity. Given an initial compensation contract for the manager, suppose interim information becomes available on the state of the world. From the standpoint of ex-ante value maximization, can it be optimal for the principal to agree to amend the terms of the original option award to re#ect this additional information?
A little re#ection reveals the tradeo! implicit in this question. Credible initial commitment by the principal not to reset contract terms gives the manager a strong incentive to avoid states from which continuation prospects are poor;
Another side of this tradeo!, which highlights initial rather than continuation incentives, was pointed out by this paper's referee. Resetting contract terms in poor states reduces a risk-averse manager's compensating di!erential for risk-bearing. Ceteris paribus, this reduces compensation expense for the principal. However, the feedback e!ect of resetting weakens initial incentives, and restoring incentives requires raising compensation levels. The formal analysis in this paper incorporates both aspects of the tradeo!.
Sections 5 and 6 were motivated by the referee's comments on an earlier version of our paper. the incentive is obviously weaker if the manager anticipates amendment of the contract terms at these states. However, there is a cost to such commitment: the inability to reset the contract in poor states will demotivate the manager at these points, leading to poor continuation outcomes for the principal as well. (Indeed, corporations routinely justify resetting as necessary to &reincentivize' employees whose options are underwater.) More generally, by allowing dependence on interim information, resetting allows the manager's "nal payo!s to incorporate a greater degree of sensitivity to the realized path; this #exibility is lost if the principal commits not to reset the contract. Thus, resetting implies two competing e!ects, a negative &feedback' e!ect on initial incentives and a positive &incentive' e!ect that gives the principal greater ability to in#uence continuation outcomes. Its optimality depends on which e!ect predominates.
Exploiting this tension, we look for conditions under which resetting could be optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. The "rst step in our analysis is to compare two natural benchmark strategies for the principal: one is the strategy of pre-commitment, which rules out resetting, and the other is the strategy of reincentivization, which resets at the interim information point whenever superior continuation values result from doing so. Our "rst result, based on a class of linear models, is a particularly unambiguous one: it is strictly better from an ex-ante standpoint for the principal to agree to reincentivize the manager fully upon the revelation of interim information than to pre-commit to retaining the initial award. The intuition underlying this construction extends more generally to models in which the manager's cost of e!ort is small in an appropriate sense; we illustrate this using a quadratic cost structure for e!ort.
These results on the superiority of reincentivization strategies in some settings are, in themselves, su$cient to refute the criticism of resetting as necessarily suboptimal. Nonetheless, the ambiguity that remains in other cases (with one benchmark strategy dominating the other depending on the speci"c parameterization) raises the question of whether further strengthening of our results is possible. We "rst observe that resetting whenever it is pro"table for the continuation can involve &too much' resetting in some circumstances given the feedback e!ect of resetting. We then introduce a broader class of strategies that provide the principal with more #exibility in this direction; of course, the benchmark strategies arise as special cases. We "nd that no ambiguity remains: optimal compensation strategies in all cases involve at least some resetting. In particular, when reincentivization strategies are already better than pre-commitment, resetting obviously continues to be optimal, but when pre-commitment is initially superior to reincentivization, a positive level of resetting (but one smaller than would be used under reincentivization) does better than both.
Building on this foundation, we then turn to the ability of managers to &manipulate' the compensation committee in the resetting decision. Our model enables us to formalize this issue in a particularly attractive way. Speci"cally, we show that the optimal level of resetting (which takes into account the feedback e!ect) typically di!ers from the level under reincentivization (which looks only at continuation values). This makes the planned resetting vulnerable, at the time of reset, to a &let-bygones-be-bygones' argument from the manager in favor of the e$cient continuation that would result under reincentivization. Of course, from the point of view of maintaining credibility in future contracting } whether with the same or other managers } and providing appropriate incentives, it would not be in the principal's interest to give in to this argument. However, to capture the possibility that the interests of shareholders and the compensation committee are imperfectly aligned, we assume that such managerial intervention is successful a given fraction of the time. Taking this as a parameter, we re-examine optimal reset strategies. As is typical in the contracting literature, we view our two-period model as capturing a slice of a more complex pattern of interactions over a longer horizon. We "nd that in all cases it still remains optimal to allow for some degree of resetting in the original contract. However, the optimal level of resetting is smaller than if managerial manipulation were not a concern; indeed, it declines monotonically as managerial in#uence over resetting increases. To understand this, recall that in general the optimal level of resetting is smaller than that under reincentivization. Thus, in the event that managerial intervention is successful, &too much' resetting will result, weakening initial incentives. To compensate, the extent of resetting that would otherwise occur must be reduced; however, this reduction never takes the form of zero resetting.
To complete our analysis, we ask a "nal question: what if managerial in#u-ence can be ruled out only when the principal commits to no resetting at all, but all positive levels of resetting remain vulnerable to managerial in#uence? (Although a commitment to no resetting at all also involves ine$cient continuations, it can be credibly enforced by corporations simply adopting this as a rule.) We "nd even here that in &most' cases, it continues to be optimal not to pre-commit to zero resetting. The exceptions occur when managerial in#uence is very strong (so the reincentivization continuation occurs with a very high probability regardless of what is planned) and reincentivization outcomes are dominated by those under pre-commitment.
In short, the argument against resetting is quite weak. First of all, the no-resetting strategy is dominated in robust classes of problems by the opposite strategy of resetting optimally for the continuation whenever this is pro"table.
Using a more general class of strategies, we show that it is actually optimal in all cases to use at least some degree of resetting. This conclusion remains true even when managers can adversely a!ect matters by sometimes causing &too much' resetting to occur. Finally, even when pre-commitment to no resetting can be credibly enforced but any positive level of resetting is vulnerable to managerial manipulation, the former emerges superior only when a speci"c restrictive combination of conditions happens to hold.
We examine a number of other extensions of the basic model, including two of particular interest. The "rst concerns settings in which either party can sever the relationship when the interim information revelation occurs. (Apart from the need to reincentivize employees, companies frequently justify resetting underwater options as necessary to retain scarce managerial talent.) We still conclude that resetting can be an optimal strategy under general conditions. In particular, the greater the explicit or implicit (i.e., productivity-related) costs of replacing the incumbent manager, the more pro"table resetting will be as a compensation strategy.
The second question concerns the impact of the relative control of the manager over the returns distribution on the optimality of resetting. Companies that reprice options often argue that the poor returns preceding the resetting were due more to factors &beyond the manager's control' than to a lack of managerial diligence. We "nd little support for this argument. Indeed, the less the relative control of the manager over the return distribution, the less optimal resetting becomes. Intuitively, factors that are beyond the manager's direct control but that a!ect return distributions constitute &background risk' for the manager. It is easier to incentivize the manager when such risk is smaller. Ceteris paribus, this superior ability to "ne-tune incentives improves continuation shareholder value; it also provides greater control over the feedback e!ect. This makes resetting more likely to be ex-ante optimal.
Other empirically relevant features of our paper bear highlighting. First, although our model allows resetting to occur at any point, in equilibrium it only occurs following poor performance. This is consistent with empirical evidence that resetting is a practice invariably preceded by negative shareholder returns (see, e.g., Brenner et al., 1998) . Second, empirically it is known that resetting has a strong inverse relation to "rm size, with its incidence increasing sharply as "rm size declines (see, e.g., Brenner et al., 1998) . It plausibly can be argued that managers of small "rms have a greater impact on their return distributions than do managers in large "rms, consistent with our result that the relative optimality of resetting increases with an increase in managerial control. Third, our model suggests that initial option awards will be larger when resetting is possible than when it is ruled out. This "nding is unintuitive at "rst blush because resettable options are worth more than ones that cannot be reset. However, to overcome the negative feedback e!ect of resettable options and restore initial incentives, it is necessary to increase the initial number of options.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section 3 presents our model and identi"es the benchmark strategies of interest. Section 4 compares equilibrium outcomes under the benchmark strategies. Section 5 looks at equilibrium under a more general class of strategies. Section 6 considers the impact of managerial in#uence over resetting. Section 7 looks at other extensions of the model. Section 8 concludes. Proofs of all results omitted in the main body of the paper are in the appendix.
The related literature
Resetting has been the focus of a number of empirical studies. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) and Saly (1994) examine resetting induced by extraordinary circumstances; Gilson and Vetsuypens look at resetting by "rms in "nancial distress during the period 1981}1987, and Saly focuses on resetting following the stock market crash of 1987. More recently, Brenner et al. (1998) and Chance et al. (1997) look at resetting under &normal' circumstances and characterize the typical reset option. Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack "nd in their sample that resetting is overwhelmingly preceded by negative stock returns, with its incidence increasing as "rm performance worsens; a strong inverse relation remains true even after correcting for industry performance. Resetting is also inversely related to size, being more prevalent among small "rms. Concerning the &typical' reset option, they report that in the vast majority of cases in their sample, the new strike price is set to the prevailing stock price at reset time; this results, on average, in a 40% drop in the strike price. Only around half of the reset options also have their maturities extended, with a mean increase of around 30 months. The authors strongly reject the hypothesis that resetting substitutes for other elements of an executive's pay, such as the award of new options.
Chance, Kumar, and Todd study market, industry, and "rm performance for a sample of "rms that reset options; their examination covers the period 250 days before and after the resetting event. They also report the presence of a strong inverse relation between resetting and "rm performance prior to the reset date. Moreover, they "nd no signi"cant improvement in shareholder returns after resetting. This "nding does not contradict the hypothesis that resetting improves employee productivity and "rm earnings because it is not apparent when the anticipation of resetting is incorporated in stock prices nor is it clear how returns would have behaved had resetting not taken place. Regarding the typical reset option, they "nd an average 40% drop in the strike, the same as in Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack. However, in contrast to the latter, they report that fewer than 10% of reset options in their sample have their maturities extended (although the average extension is a high 66 months).
On the theoretical front, Saly (1994) studies a contracting model in which two possible economic environments can prevail, with the abnormal one signifying
We thank the referee for drawing this paper to our attention.
an economic downturn. The principal and agent agree upon a contract presuming that the normal environment will prevail. The state of the world is then revealed (before the agent has taken any payo!-relevant action). If the normal state of the world actually obtains, the agreed-upon contract is implemented; if not, the contract is reset. Crucially, unlike our model, the interim state in Saly's model is exogenous: it is not related to an earlier action of the agent. Thus, there can be no feedback e!ect from resetting, so the model cannot be meaningfully used to examine the relative optimality of pre-commitment and reincentivization strategies. Indeed, it is apparent that reincentivization strategies are uniquely optimal in Saly's framework. Johnson and Tian (1999) study six nontraditional stock option plans including options that can be reset. They focus on estimating the value of each plan in a Black-Scholes framework; and on gauging each plan's incentive e!ects by studying its parameter sensitivities. They use a risk-neutral valuation setting in which the price process is taken as given and derive closed-form solutions for the options' values. In contrast, we use an optimal contracting model in which the principal's and agent's action choices are explicitly modeled and the returns process is controlled by the manager, who is provided incentives by the principal in the form of options.
Also relevant, but less directly related to our paper, are three other branches of the literature that look at the feedback e!ect of recontracting. Two are outgrowths of Hart and Moore (1988) and deal, respectively, with bilateral bargaining (e.g., Aghion et al., 1990; Hart and Tirole, 1988) and debt recontracting (Aghion and Bolton, 1992 , Bolton and Scharfstein, 1989 , 1996 Gale and Hellwig, 1989; Hart and Moore, 1994 , 1995 . The third concerns design of bankruptcy procedures. The trade o! here is that systems that favor renegotiation in distress promote e$cient continuations in the event of default but at the cost of encouraging the occurrence of default. One important di!erence between our paper and those listed here is that moral hazard in our framework arises from the dependence of the "rm's cash #ow distribution on the e!ort-averse manager's actions. In much of the recontracting literature, the cash #ow process is treated as exogenous and moral hazard arises from the nonveri"ability of the cash #ows, that is, from the manager's ability to e!ect strategic defaults. Thus, the &shirking' or risk-shifting incentives of the renegotiation process are not examined.
The model
In this section, we present the structure of our model, identify the benchmark strategies of interest, and de"ne equilibrium in these cases. We consider a two-period model of "rm value with dates indexed by t"0, 1, 2. Our model is intended to capture the impact of information revelation in the interim between inception of a compensation contract and its culmination. To this end, we assume that all payo!s are received only at the terminal date t"2. This enables the interim date t"1 to serve purely as an information event concerning "nal outcomes, providing a basis for resetting the terms of the initial contract.
The speci"cs of our model are motivated by the popular binomial model of asset-pricing theory, augmented to endogenize returns distributions. It will help to refer to Fig. 1 while going through the description of the model.
The "rm in our model belongs to an entrepreneur (the &principal') who employs a manager (the &agent') for the two periods. The initial investment in the "rm is normalized to unity. There is a single liquidating cash #ow from the "rm at t"2. This cash #ow has three possible values: H, H¸"¸H, and¸, where H'1'¸. The probabilities of these cash #ows depend on the actions (e!ort levels) taken by the manager in each of the two periods.
The manager's set of possible actions in each period is A" [0, a ] . In the "rst period, the manager takes an action a3A. Subsequent to this action, a public signal s3+H,¸, is observed concerning the terminal cash #ows. If the signal H is observed, then terminal cash #ows will be either H or H¸; if the signal is¸, then terminal cash #ows will be either¸H or¸. After observing the signal, the manager chooses his second-period action; we will denote by a F the action following the signal H and by a J the action following the signal¸. The probabilities of the signals and of the "nal cash #ows depend on the actions taken by the manager. Given the initial period action a, the signal H is observed with probability p(a) and the signal¸with probability q(a)"1!p(a). If H occurs and the manager follows it up with the action a F , then the terminal cash #ow H is realized with probability p(a F ) and the cash #ow H¸with probability q(a F )"1!p(a F ). Similarly, if¸occurs and the manager follows it with the action a J , the cash #ows¸H and¸ are observed with probabilities p(a J ) and q(a J )"1!p(a J ), respectively. We allow for the possibility that p( ) ) depends on other &external' parameters in Section 7.3; in the interests of notational simplicity, we do not highlight this dependence here.
Taking the action a in any period also results in a cost or disutility to the manager of c(a). Let W"(w FF , w FJ , w JF , w JJ ) denote a typical compensation pro"le for the manager, i.e., a typical vector of contingent payo!s at the four terminal nodes. (We will have more to say about the choice of W shortly.) The manager's objective is to choose an initial action a, and contingent continuation actions a F and a J at the nodes H and¸, respectively, to maximize the discounted expected value of his compensation net of the costs of these actions.
As is usual, we assume the principal is risk-neutral. The principal takes into account the manager's response to any initial o!er and selects a compensation pro"le that maximizes his own initial expected utility, viz., the discounted expected terminal value of the "rm, net of the manager's compensation. We elaborate on these optimization problems below. To keep notation simple, we set all discount rates in the model to zero. We also assume that the principal}manager relationship lasts the full two periods. This is a reasonable assumption in our framework, which is essentially a one-period model with an interim information event. Nonethless, Sections 7.1 and 7.2 look at the impact of allowing either the principal or the manager to sever the relationship upon revelation of the interim information. We "nd that while this complicates exposition, under very general and reasonable conditions it does not a!ect the qualitative nature of our results.
Equilibrium
We describe the manager's best-response problem "rst. Let W be the compensation pro"le anticipated by the manager. At this point, we assume no randomization in the resetting process. This is without loss of generality, since our focus in this section and the next is on two strategies } where contracts are never reset, and where they are reset whenever continuation values can be improved } for which this consideration is not relevant. (Section 5 considers a more general class of strategies that includes the possibility of randomization in the resetting decision.) It is important to note that the anticipated compensation vector need not be the same as that o!ered by the principal at time t"0 if the manager expects that resetting will take place at time t"1 (this anticipation of future changes is precisely what causes the feedback e!ect of resetting). Given W and any action vector A"(a, a F , a J ), the manager's continuation utility from H, denoted ; F , is given by
The manager's continuation utility ; J from¸is analogously de"ned. Thus, the manager's initial expected utility from W and A is ;(a, ;
It is clear from these expressions that in response to the anticipated o!er W, the manager's optimal actions at the nodes H and¸, denoted aH F and aH J , must satisfy
Therefore, letting ;H
, the optimal initial action aH is de"ned by aH"arg max ?
Given a compensation pro"le W and the manager's response A"(a, a F , a J ), the principal's continuation utility from H, denoted < F , is given by
The principal's continuation utility < J from¸is de"ned analogously. Therefore, the principal's initial expected utility (or value) < is
The principal chooses an initial o!er W to maximize < taking into account the manager's reaction to W. In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on this choice through two benchmark cases. The "rst, that of pre-commitment, considers the situation in which resetting of the initial award is ruled out; the principal makes an initial compensation o!er and sticks to it in all circumstances regardless of the interim information revelation. The second case, which we call &contingent resetting' for now, considers the opposite case in which taking the interim information into account, the contract is reset optimally to maximize the principal's continuation value.
To keep our focus on the issues motivating this paper, we will center much of the analysis on the situation in which the terminal payo!s W are induced solely by call options on the "rm's terminal value. This simpli"cation enables us to sharpen the presentation and, especially, to capture in a transparent form the tension between the reincentivization and feedback e!ects of resetting. We emphasize, though, that this assumption is made in the interests of expositional clarity. Our results hold under far more general conditions, as we discuss in Section 7.4. In particular, considerations such as equity or cash bonuses complicate notation but add little of substance to the analysis.
Equilibrium under pre-commitment
The "rst case of interest is motivated by a setting in which the corporation granting stock options commits to not changing the strike price of the options regardless of what transpires during the option's life. (This is e!ectively the behavior corporations have been called upon to adopt by critics of resetting.) In our model, this corresponds to a situation in which the principal grants the agent an initial quantity of call options on the "rm's terminal (t"2) value and commits not to alter the contract at the interim point t"1. By analogy with practice, with executive stock options overwhelmingly issued at-the-money, we will assume that any initial options awarded by the principal carry a strike price of unity.
Given any particular value of , the agent's payo!s at maturity under are easily determined. If, for instance, we have H¸(1, these terminal payo!s are given by
Under pre-commitment, the compensation anticipated by the manager at the terminal nodes is the initial one o!ered by the principal; thus, (7) is also the manager's anticipated compensation under . Using this, the manager's response AH( ) and the equilibrium payo! <( ) to the principal can be computed. The principal then chooses to maximize <( ).
Equilibrium under contingent resetting
The second benchmark case of interest is when the principal amends the contract at time t"1 whenever this improves his continuation value. There are actually two distinct cases to consider here, but only one of real interest, as we discuss below.
In practice, options are overwhelmingly reset at-the-money (see, e.g., Brenner et al., 1998 ). We will assume by analogy that if the initially awarded options in our model are reset at the nodes H or¸, their strike prices are changed to H oŗ , respectively. Secondly, we also allow resetting to a!ect the number of options held by the manager. This captures the important possibility that reincentivization can involve more than just a one-for-one exchange of old options for new ones. (For instance, IBM in 1993 o!ered its managers the opportunity to exchange their previously issued options for new options with lower strikes at a 5 : 2 ratio.) Finally, we impose the natural restriction that any o!er made by the principal at t"1 is "rm, that is, it cannot be rescinded or altered at t"2 (the problem is trivial otherwise).
A "rst possibility in de"ning payo!s under contingent resetting is that the principal retains unlimited right to alter any initial contract terms at t"1. In this case, the contract will be reset at each node to maximize the principal's continuation value from that node. Since these revisions will be anticipated by the agent, any initial o!er is irrelevant, and the equilibrium is determined by the optimal o!ers H F and H J for the principal at the nodes H and¸. The second possibility is motivated by the observation that resetting in practice is almost exclusively associated with underwater options; contract terms are virtually never reset after a good performance when the options are in-themoney, even if managers are &overincentivized' at that point. The analog of this in our model is when the principal retains the right to amend the contract &upwards' in the manager's favor at time t"1, i.e., to alter the contract if the revision also bene"ts the manager by improving his continuation utility. This leads to an appealing setting in which the principal can reset incentives for demotivated employees by increasing their compensation, but otherwise leaves the contract untouched.
Of these two formulations, the latter is certainly more attractive. It conforms better to observed reality: companies do not penalize overincentivized employees by resetting their options downwards following good performance. It also implicitly suggests that the principal cannot rescind the original contract except at a high cost, which appears reasonable from the standpoint of maintaining credibility in labor markets. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as assuming that the manager also has some bargaining power at reset time, and, in particular, can veto contract changes. It turns out that the "rst formulation also can be eliminated on the stronger grounds of analytical irrelevance: it is always dominated (for the principal) by the strategy of only resetting upwards. Indeed, in the latter case, the principal can always make the initial o!er of "0 which would permit arbitrary upward revisions at time t"1. Thus, any possible outcome under unrestricted resetting continues to remain feasible. Given this, we focus attention on only the latter case in the rest of this paper, and refer to it as the strategy of reincentivization.
Solving for equilibrium outcomes under reincentivization is a little more complex than under pre-commitment. The procedure works as follows. Given an initial o!er of call options (struck at unity), we "rst solve for the manager's continuation utilities from H and¸under this o!er. Then, from each node, we maximize the principal's expected continuation utility over feasible continuation o!ers (which could involve resetting) taking as given the manager's optimal response to each o!er and subject to the constraint that the new o!er must provide the manager at least as much continuation utility as the initial o!er. Of course, the principal's and manager's expected utilities in this solution depend on the continuation payo!s associated with the original o!er ; this provides us an expression for the initial expected utilities in terms of . We then maximize the principal's initial expected utility over all o!ers to recover the initial equilibrium o!er.
Pre-commitment vs. reincentivization: the tradeows
The forces that di!erentiate reincentivization strategies from pre-commitment can be identi"ed in a particularly transparent form by simply comparing the payo!-generation possibilities when resetting is feasible to those in (7) under pre-commitment. Assume as in (7) that H¸(1 (an obvious comparison holds if H¸*1). Suppose that the principal makes an initial o!er of options, each with a strike price of unity. Suppose further that at the node¸, these options are replaced by calls each with a strike of¸. The manager's terminal payo!s are then given by
Two e!ects of resetting are implicit in (8). First, we now have the possibility that w JF Ow FJ , which is impossible under pre-commitment. More generally, resetting allows for greater sensitivity of "nal payo!s to the observed history and thereby expands the set of possible terminal payo!s. As a consequence, it allows for superior continuation prospects from¸than are possible without resetting. This takes us to the second point, which is that this expansion does not come without cost. Indeed, resetting at the node¸generally involves improving the manager's continuation prospects also. This reduces the &spread' (; F !; J ) between the manager's continuation utilities from H and¸, respectively, which then reduces initial incentives to avoid the node¸. This tension between the positive e!ect on incentivization and the negative feedback e!ect on initial incentives determines if resetting is a value-maximizing strategy for the principal. It forms the subject matter of the rest of the paper.
Reincentivization vs. pre-commitment
In this section, we present our "rst results on the optimality of resetting. We compare the two benchmark strategies de"ned above: pre-commitment strategies, which never reset, and reincentivization strategies, which reset whenever this improves continuation values. We show that under robust conditions, reincentivization strategies can produce superior ex-ante values for the principal despite the negative e!ect they have on initial incentives. This conclusion is derived in two steps. First, we consider a &linear' family of models and show that for any parameter con"guration then, pre-commitment strategies are strictly inferior to reincentivization strategies. We show that the intuition underlying this result extends more generally to situations in which the manager's cost of e!ort is &small' in an appropriately de"ned sense.
A linear model
For reincentivization to dominate pre-commitment, the feedback e!ect of resetting must be minimal, but its e!ect on continuation payo!s must be strong. Thus, the manager's continuation utilities from resetting and not resetting cannot di!er widely (this will minimize the feedback e!ect) but the manager's actions in the two cases must di!er substantially (so the principal gets the bene"ts of resetting). We describe in this subsection a model with linear payo!s for both players that meets these conditions.
We take the space of feasible actions for the manager to be [0, a ] for some a (1. The functions p( ) ) and c( ) ) for the manager are both assumed to have linear forms: p(a)"a and c(a)"ka, where k'0. Further, we will assume that k(¸H!¸. (Without this restriction, the continuation from¸becomes trivial since it will be unpro"table for the principal to ever o!er a positive payo! to the manager.) Finally, we will assume that H¸(1; this simpli"es payo!s in the analysis. Note that formal model of the sort described here cannot distinguish between new issues of options and resetting of existing options. It is therefore implicit in the remainder of this paper that no new options are issued at time t"1. This is consistent with the "nding in Brenner et al. (1998) that resetting does not appear to be a substitute for the granting of new options.
Equilibrium under pre-commitment
Let be given. The manager's terminal payo!s at the four nodes are given by (7). Therefore, at the node H, the manager's action a F is determined as the solution to
It is immediate that a F and the manager's continuation utility ; F from H are given by
;
At¸, regardless of the choice of , the continuation payo!s for the manager are always zero. It follows trivially that a J and ; J are given by
Finally, at the initial node, the manager solves max ?Z ? +a; F #(1!a); J !ka,. The optimal action at time 0, therefore, is
Expressions (9)}(12) make clear the choices facing the principal. If the principal sets so that (; F !; J )(k, then from (12), the node H is never reached, so from (11), the "nal outcome is¸ with certainty. Thus, contingent on this case, the principal's best choice is to set "0, which provides an initial expected utility to the principal of¸.
On the other hand, suppose the principal sets so that ; F !; J *k. Since k'0 and ; J "0, this can happen only if ; F '0, so ; F must be given by the second value in (10), i.e., ; F "a (H!1)!ka . Therefore, (; F !; J )*k holds if and only if
In addition, (10) implies that for ; F to be given by a (H!1)!ka , must also satisfy (H!1)*k. Now, it is clearly in the principal's interest to have as small as possible. An easy calculation shows that the least value of that satis"es both of the required inequalities is when equality holds in (13). For this value of , a further computation shows that the principal's initial expected utility is given by [a H#a (1!a )H¸#(1!a )¸!ka (1#a )]. This is larger thaņ if, and only if, (a H#¸)(H!¸)*k(1#a ). But this last inequality always holds, since k(H¸!¸ by assumption, and H'¸.
To sum up, therefore, the equilibrium under pre-commitment has the following values for and the principal's initial expected utility <:
and <"a H#a (1!a )H¸#(1!a )¸!ka (1#a ).
In this equilibrium, the manager takes the action a at the initial node and at the node H, but continues with a J "0 if the node¸is reached.
The superiority of reincentivization
Under pre-commitment, the continuation value from¸is¸ for the principal and zero for the manager. If resetting is possible, however, the principal will be able to induce a better action for the manager. Speci"cally, note that if the principal resets by o!ering new at-the-money options, the manager's optimal action a J in the continuation from¸is
It is evident that the optimal reset contract is either "0 or "k/(¸H!¸). If "0 (i.e., the principal does not reset), then the principal's continuation utility from¸is, of course, < J "¸. On the other hand, if "k/(¸H!¸), we have a J "a , so the principal's continuation utility is
This quantity is greater than¸ under our assumption that¸H!¸'k. Thus, it is optimal for the principal to reset at¸by setting "k/(¸H!¸), which results in the continuation value (16) for the principal. The continuation value ; J for the manager is
Observe the important point that the manager's continuation utility from¸in this case is the same as without resetting. This means that optimal resetting aţ has no feedback e!ect on the manager's "rst-period action. Now, we have seen that the optimal initial o!er when there is no resetting is given by
Suppose the principal were to make the initial o!er (18) when resetting is permitted. We will show that the principal's time 0 expected utility from making this initial o!er is strictly larger than his time 0 expected utility in the precommitment equilibrium. Since (18) is a feasible, but not necessarily optimal, initial o!er in this case, the superiority of reincentivization over pre-commitment in this setting is proved. It is easy to check that if the principal makes the initial o!er as de"ned by (18), it is optimal for the principal never to reset contingent on reaching H, but to reset to "k/(¸H!¸) options with a strike of¸if the node¸is reached. As a consequence, 1. the principal's continuation utility < F from H under this strategy is the same as in the pre-commitment equilibrium; 2. the principal's continuation utility < J from¸, given by (16), is strictly higher than the continuation level of¸ in the pre-commitment equilibrium; and 3. resetting at¸does not change the manager's continuation utility ; J from (see (17)), so the manager's "rst-period incentives are una!ected, and his "rst-period action continues to be given by a .
It follows from this that the principal's time 0 value under reincentivization from the feasible initial o!er is strictly larger than that in the pre-commitment equilibrium.
The linear/quadratic model
The driving force behind the unambiguous superiority of reincentivization strategies in the linear model is the ability to reset contracts in the continuation without a feedback e!ect on initial incentives. A natural question here is what if the model is such that resetting implies a nonzero feedback e!ect? In such situations, it would also be necessary to raise the manager's incentives in the initial period to counteract this negative e!ect; more speci"cally, the initial o!er would have to be increased to enlarge the utility spread (; F !; J ). Whether this is pro"table for the principal depends on the required increase in initial incentives: if the &bang per buck' is large (a moderate increase su$ces to create a substantial e!ect on the manager's actions), we would expect to be able to pro"tably implement a change in the initial incentives, and resetting would dominate pre-commitment. Conversely, if a substantial increase is needed, pre-commitment would emerge superior.
Of course, the impact of a change in the utility spread on initial actions depends ultimately on the manager's cost function. Thus, when costs are &small' relative to their productivity impact, we would expect resetting to be superior. In this subsection, we demonstrate this point in the context of a linear-quadratic model, though, of course, the intuition holds more generally. Speci"cally, we take the functions p( ) ) and c( ) ) to be given by
For analytical simplicity, we also continue to assume that H¸)1. (Qualitatively identical behavior emerges when H¸'1, but closed-form solutions appear hard to obtain in this case, since the algebra becomes dense.) Under these parameterizations, the appendix describes in detail the derivation of equilibrium under both pre-commitment and reincentivization. Based on the discussion above, we would expect that if the parameter k of the cost function is small, it should be possible to make up for the feedback e!ect, since a small increase in the continuation utility at H will then have a large impact on the initial action. Thus, resetting should emerge dominant in this case. As k increases, ever-larger payouts are required to make up for the feedback e!ect, and we would expect pre-commitment to fare better.
That this intuition is correct is borne out in Table 1 , which summarizes equilibrium payo!s under either regime for speci"ed parameter values. Three values of k are considered, chosen to highlight the importance of this parameter in the choice between pre-commitment and resetting. For this range of parameter values, equilibrium values and option awards have the following form (C and R denote pre-commitment and resetting, respectively):
Several aspects of the table bear highlighting. First, we "nd (Appendix A.2) that even when resetting is permitted, it is never optimal to reset at the node H. Accordingly, Table 1 provides only one reset entry, , which is the number of options in the optimal reset at¸. Observe that since is strictly positive for the parameter values in the table, resetting is strictly preferable to not resetting in the continuation from¸.
Secondly, the size of the initial o!er is substantially higher in each case under reincentivization than under pre-commitment. This is expected: resetting at¸has an unfavorable feedback e!ect on initial incentives for the manager, since it lowers the utility spread (; F !; J ). The higher is required to compensate for this. Thirdly, as expected, reincentivization emerges superior to pre-commitment at low values of k: it is possible in these cases to use the higher value of to We thank the referee for pointing this out. compensate for the feedback e!ect pro"tably. (See, e.g., the equilibrium outcomes corresponding to k"0.050 in the table.) As k increases, the gap between the regimes narrows, and the two are roughly equal from the principal's standpoint at the table's middle value of k"0.075. At still higher values of k, pre-commitment becomes uniquely dominant. Using (21)}(22), the cross-over point is seen to be k"0.062 (approx.).
Finally, note that the manager is always better o! under a reincentivization regime than in a pre-commitment regime. This improvement obtains from two sources. On the one hand, the resettable options the manager initially receives under reincentivization are each worth more, a priori, than the "xed options received under pre-commitment. Compounding this e!ect, he also receives more options initially under reincentivization than under pre-commitment. This limited observation should not be taken to imply strict improvement in the manager's welfare whenever resetting is &legally' permissible. In the &supergame' in which the principal "rst chooses between reincentivization and pre-commitment and the game then evolves, Table 1 shows that for some parameterizations, the principal will "nd it optimal to pre-commit not to reset. Allowing the principal this initial choice leaves the manager with the same welfare as when resetting is prohibited altogether.
Resetting in a more general context
By resetting optimally whenever continuation values are thereby increased, it appears likely that reincentivization strategies will involve &too much' resetting in some circumstances given the feedback e!ect on initial incentives. Despite this limitation, reincentivization can still be strictly value-improving over pre-commitment. Nonetheless, it is of interest to inquire whether the results of the previous section can be further strengthened by improving the principal's #exibility in the resetting decision. In this section, we examine equilibrium outcomes under such a broader class of strategies. For speci"city, we continue with the linear-quadratic model of the previous subsection.
We expand the set of compensation strategies in two directions. First, unlike under reincentivization, we do not insist that resetting involve choosing the level that maximizes the principal's continuation value, but instead allow the principal to commit to any particular choice of reset options at the node¸. (Since resetting at H never occurs in equilibrium, we avoid spurious generality in the notation, and focus only on resetting at¸.) Second, we permit randomization in the resetting decision; that is, rather than require that contracts always be reset when this is pro"table for the continuation (as under reincentivization) or never reset in any circumstances (as under pre-commitment), we allow the principal to choose a probability that the contract will be reset.
Thus, the principal's strategy now involves the choice of three quantities: the size of the initial award, the probability of resetting at¸, and the size of the reset award. Of course, the benchmark strategies are now special cases. For example, if "0 or "0, there is no resetting at¸; this corresponds to the case of pre-commitment. Similarly, the strategy of reincentivization obtains if "1 and is set equal to the level H that would prevail in this case. Moreover, there are now two ways of controlling the feedback e!ect: reducing the size of the reset award or reducing the probability of resetting .
Given ( , , ), the manager receives the terminal payo!s (7) if resetting does not occur at¸and the terminal payo!s (8) if it does. Using these payo!s, we can easily compute 1. the manager's optimal action a F at H, and the resulting continuation values ; F and < F for the manager and principal,
The manager now picks an initial action a to maximize time 0 expected utility:
The optimal action aH then determines the principal's expected value as
The principal now picks , , and to maximize (26). We will refer to the value of in the optimal contract as the optimal reset level. Table 2 presents equilibrium outcomes under optimal resetting for the same sets of parameter values as in Table 1 . (To keep the notation distinct, a &hat' is used over the relevant variables here.) A comparison of the tables reveals several interesting points.
First, we mention at the top of this section that reincentivization can potentially involve &too much' resetting. This is borne out by a comparison of the numbers in Tables 1 and 2 . For example, at k"0.100, we have "0.540 under reincentivization; however, Table 2 shows that the optimal reset level in this case is just K "0.250.
Second, Table 2 shows that it is optimal in all cases to have some degree of resetting; indeed, the optimal level of resetting in all cases lies strictly between "0 (the resetting level under pre-commitment) and " H (the resetting level (20), (ii) < K and ; K are, respectively, the principal's and agent's expected utilities in equilibrium, (iii) ( is the number of options in the initial award, (iv) K is the number of options in the optimal reset at¸, and (v) is the equilibrium probability of resetting at¸. This issue was raised by the referee in a report on an earlier version of this paper.
under reincentivization). This shows, in particular, that the inferiority of reincentivization compared to pre-commitment at high values of k stems from &excess-ive' resetting. Thirdly, the optimal reset level K is increasing in k. This suggests that resetting is likely to remain optimal at all levels of the cost parameter k (it is already optimal for all small k because even reincentivization does better than precommitment in this case).
Lastly, allowing for randomization does not appear to have any impact on the equilibrium. In all cases in Table 2 (and in a wide variety of other parameterizations), the equilibrium value of is unity. This appears to arise from the feature that and are partially substitutes: a lowering of either reduces feedback e!ects (and expected continuation values). Moreover, even with "xed at unity, the continuum between pre-commitment and reincentivization is achieved by letting vary between zero (the resetting level under pre-commitment) and H (the resetting level under reincentivization). In the remainder of the paper, therefore, we omit this parameter in the interests of notational simplicity.
The impact of managerial in6uence over resetting
An important issue concerning resetting in general is the in#uence managers have over the resetting decision and the impact on the optimality of allowing for resetting. The model we develope here enables a sharp formalization and study of this question. Speci"cally, the results of the last section indicate that resetting is clearly an optimal policy to follow in general even from the point of view of maximizing ex-ante shareholder value. Yet the nature of the optimal reset level raises questions of enforceability. Unlike the reincentivization policy, which is based solely on choosing an e$cient continuation, the optimal reset policy also takes into account the feedback e!ect in choosing the level of resetting to follow; thus, it is not, in general, e$cient for the continuation alone. This makes the policy vulnerable at the time of reset to an argument from the manager in favor of resetting e$ciently for the continuation alone regardless of what was envisaged in the original strategy. In this section, we examine how the equilibrium is a!ected if the manager has at least some ability to in#uence the resetting decision in this way.
A parenthetic discussion is important here regarding why the principal would wish to stick to the level of resetting envisaged in the original contract and, given this, why managerial in#uence might succeed in changing this decision. Concerning the former, we view our model as a simple way of capturing a more complex interaction over a longer horizon. From the point of view of retaining credibility in future contracting } with the same or other managers } and providing appropriate incentives, it is then important for the principal to stick to the resetting originally envisaged. On the other hand, in allowing managerial in#uence over the resetting decision to sometimes be successful, we aim to capture the important possibility that shareholder interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the compensation committee.
In notational terms, we extend the model of the previous section as follows. Let ( , ) be any contract chosen by the principal, and let H denote the optimal level of resetting for the continuation alone, i.e., the level of resetting that would occur under reincentivization. We formalize successful managerial in#uence over the resetting decision with a parameter e3 [0, 1] by assuming that with probability e, the manager is successful in having the contract reset to the e$cent-continuation contract H at the node¸while, with probability 1!e, the originally envisaged reset is implemented at¸. With the parameter e taken as exogenous, we examine how this changes the optimality of allowing for resetting. In particular, what optimal level of resetting will be envisaged in the original contract if the ability of managers to possibly have the contract reset to H (with probability e) is anticipated? Intuitively, the direction of the impact is not hard to see. The level H involves more resetting than is optimal given the feedback e!ect. To counteract this e!ect, the resetting level K envisaged in the original contract must be reduced. In particular, we would expect the optimal level of planned resetting (denoted, say, K C ) to decline monotonically in e. However, since K C cannot become negative, it is interesting to ask whether K C becomes zero for high e and whether resetting becomes suboptimal as managerial in#uence over the resetting decision increases. Tables 1 and 2 . The parameter e3 [0, 1] denotes managerial in#uence over the resetting decision as de"ned in Section 6; e"0 corresponds to the case of no in#uence. H is the reset award that results from successful managerial intervention in the resetting decision. Given e, (i) < K C and ; K C are, respectively, the principal's and manager's expected utilities in equilibrium, (ii) ( C is the initial option award, and (iii) K C is the reset award envisaged in the original contract. the details of the derivation of equilibrium here; it is apparent how the presentation of the previous sections can be extended towards this end.) To retain comparability, the values of all parameters (except for e) are the same as in the previous tables. In particular, the resetting level H under reincentivization can be read o! Table 1, and the optimal resetting level K in the absence of managerial in#uence can be read o! Table 2 . The subscript e is added to all equilibrium quantities to underline their dependence on this parameter. The table con"rms the intuitive arguments made above and also establishes that planning for a positive level of resetting remains optimal even when managerial in#uence becomes &large'. As anticipated, the optimal reset level K C envisaged in the optimal contract decreases as e increases. In particular, K C is everywhere smaller that the optimal reset level K in the absence of managerial in#uence. Second, as e increases, the manager's utility level in equilibrium increases while the principal's falls. This is intuitive, since e measures the relative power of the manager in one aspect of the interaction. Third, the rate of decline of K C as e increases is very slow; even at very high values of e, K C is strictly positive. In other words, planning for some positive level of resetting remains optimal even when managerial in#uence over resetting becomes large. K C remains strictly positive even as e approaches its upper bound of unity; for e"0.90, the optimal levels of K C in the three panels are 0.181, 0.209, and 0.219, respectively. Lastly, as with K in Table 2 , for any "xed e, the optimal level K C increases in k. Thus, optimal resetting remains strictly positive at all levels of k.
One "nal point is important. In computing these equilibrium values, we assume that whenever the principal commits to an ine$cient continuation, the manager can argue successfully (with probability e) in favor of the e$cient continuation H. An exception, however, could arise when the principal precommits to no resetting. In this case, ine$cient continuations will certainly result from some states. Nonetheless, it appears plausible that when the corporation adopts no resetting as a general policy, adverse managerial in#uence at these nodes can be forestalled.
Accepting this possibility for the moment, how would the optimality of resetting change? As e increases towards its upper bound of unity, the likelihood of resetting according to H increases towards unity, so the principal's value in equilibrium approaches the value under reincentivization. When reincentivization is anyway superior to pre-commitment (e.g., k"0.050), this makes no di!erence to the optimality of resetting. However, when pre-commitment is preferable to reincentivization, this means that as managerial in#uence over resetting becomes high, it could become preferable to pre-commit not to reset at all.
Two caveats are important here, however. First, note from Table 3 that managerial in#uence has to be quite high before pre-commitment becomes optimal. For example, in the middle panel (k"0.075), pre-commitment dominates reincentivization, but even at e"0.50, optimal resetting is preferable to pre-commitment. Second, it is very important that the commitment to no resetting be credible, i.e., that managerial attempts to have the contract reset not work. If such credible commitment is doubtful or impossible, then the structure of the optimal policy is as outlined in Table 3 , and this always involves some resetting.
Extensions of the model
This section discusses several extensions of our basic model. Our main purpose in this exercise is to emphasize that even with these added features, the basic tradeo!s we identify in this paper remain. We also focus on comparing the benchmark reincentivization and pre-commitment strategies, since the intuitive arguments are clearest in this context. We discuss four extensions. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 allow for a termination of the principal}manager relationship at the interim information point initiated by, respectively, the principal and the manager. Section 7.3 then looks at the optimality of resetting as a function of the relative control the manager has over the returns distribution. Lastly, Section 7.4 explains why our results would be essentially una!ected by allowing more general compensation structures.
Allowing dismissal of the manager
Our model presumes that the principal/manager relationship lasts the full length of the horizon, i.e., neither party can elect to terminate the relationship at t"1. This is not an unreasonable assumption to make since our model is, in e!ect, a one-period model with an interim time point at which information is received. Nonetheless, it seems worthwhile to examine the consequences of allowing a termination of the relationship subsequent to the revelation of information. Under reasonable assumptions, the addition of this feature complicates our model notationally but does not add anything essential to the incentivization vs. feedback issue at the heart of this paper.
Suppose the principal can dismiss the incumbent manager after one period. We "rst analyze the case in which the dismissed manager is replaced with an ex-ante identical manager under the assumption that this replacement is costless for the principal. Under this condition, we will show that the pre-commitment and resetting strategies are equivalent for the principal.
Take any strategy for the principal that uses resetting. Consider the precommitment strategy which makes the same initial o!er and proceeds as follows. At any node where the resetting strategy "res the manager, the precommitment strategy also "res the manager. At any node where the resetting strategy alters the terms of an existing contract, the pre-commitment strategy "res the manager and o!ers the new manager the reset contract. The continuation payo!s for the principal from any node are never worse under precommitment than under resetting. Moreover, the initial incentives are evidently no weaker under pre-commitment. It is clear that pre-commitment cannot do worse than resetting.
Conversely, take any strategy under pre-commitment. Consider the strategy under resetting that makes the same initial o!er and proceeds as follows. The strategy "res the manager at any node where either (a) the pre-commitment strategy "res the manager or (b) a Pareto-improving resetting is possible but would have a negative feedback e!ect. (If resetting would also have a positive feedback e!ect, the strategy does not "re and resets accordingly.) The initial incentives are then no weaker under resetting than under pre-commitment, and the continuation payo!s are never worse for the principal. Therefore, resetting must do at least as well as pre-commitment. Thus, the two must be equivalent in equilibrium.
This equivalence is less impressive than it appears at "rst blush. It is driven by the assumption that the manager can be replaced in mid-stream at no cost. In e!ect, this assumption presents the principal with a situation in which superior continuation payo!s can be generated without weakening initial incentives through a feedback e!ect. In practice, however, costs can drive a wedge between the continuation values realized using incumbent managers and those obtainable by replacement. (Such costs also explain what would otherwise be irrational: why corporations retain and reincentivize existing managers rather than replacing them.) These costs can be explicit such as hiring costs or costs associated with terminating the original contract, or implicit costs (i.e., productivity losses) such as the presence of learning-by-doing e!ects on account of which the new manager will not initially be as productive as the one replaced. There can also be adverse selection considerations giving untried managers uncertain productivity characteristics.
When such costs exist, the optimal resetting of an existing contract will result in a strictly higher continuation payo! than replacing the manager and o!ering the new manager an optimal contract for the continuation. Of course, the &tighter' the human resource constraint (i.e., the higher the costs of replacement), the greater will be this di!erence. Thus, allowing for resetting provides for superior continuations, but } via the feedback e!ect } has a negative e!ect on initial incentives. Conversely, pre-committing to "ring the manager at certain nodes will provide superior initial incentives but poor continuation payo!s at those nodes. These tradeo!s are precisely the ones at the heart of this paper.
Allowing the manager to quit
Corporations that reset options typically o!er two reasons to justify their actions. One is the need to reincentivize employees whose options are underwater; this point has, of course, formed the focus of our paper. A second reason is that resetting serves as a device to help retain employees who might otherwise quit. If our model is extended to allow for the manager to resign after one period, it can be shown that the same results as in Section 7.1 hold: (a) if there are no implicit or explicit costs of replacing the incumbent manager, pre-commitment and resetting are equivalent strategies, and (b) this equivalence is broken, and the choice between these alternatives resembles the issues discussed in this paper, if more reasonable assumptions are made concerning these costs. (The details are available upon request.)
Managerial control and the optimality of resetting
Resetting stock options is sometimes defended by suggesting that the poor performance preceding the resetting is driven by factors beyond the manager's control. In this section, we examine the extent to which such an argument is justi"ed.
As the "rst step in this process, we generalize the linear-quadratic model of Section 4.2 to incorporate a notion of managerial &control' over return generation. Speci"cally, we assume that given an action a3 [0, a ] for the manager, we have
where and q are given parameters in [0, 1]. Expression (27) and the interpretation of and q can be motivated in the following way. Suppose that when the action a is taken, the outcomes are realized independently of the manager's action with probability q, with the likelihood of the di!erent outcomes given by
and that with probability 1!q, the outcome distribution is determined by a, with
The parameter q has an obvious interpretation as a measure of managerial control: ceteris paribus, the lower is q, the higher is the in#uence of the manager's action in determining the likelihoods of "nal rewards. The parameter determines the direction of impact of the external factors. Other things equal, a higher value for implies a higher overall likelihood of H. As such, high values of connote favorable outside factors (such as higher industry or economy growth) that enhance "rm performance, while low values of indicate unfavorable external conditions (such as recessionary trends in the market). Moreover, combining (28) and (29), the overall probabilities of H and¸arise as in (27) . We stress that these probabilities are confounding: the principal only observes the outcome H or¸, and cannot determine whether the outcome was in#uenced by external factors or the manager's actions. Note that the impact of external factors remains qualitatively identical if we replace the &convex combination' speci"cation (27) with Prob(H)"m# a, where m and are positive quantities denoting, respectively, the contributions of the external factor and the manager (details are available from the authors).
Speci"cation (27) is also particularly advantageous from an analytical standpoint. When the cost structure is quadratic, equilibria under (27) can be identi-"ed by essentially retracing the steps in the appendix with a few minor changes. We omit the details here, focusing instead on the properties of equilibrium under pre-commitment and reincentivization. Table 4 summarizes equilibrium outcomes in two parts. The "rst panel in the table describes equilibrium payo!s and compensation levels under either regime for a given value of and a range of values of q. The second panel in the table presents the diwerence < 0 !< ! between the principal's values under reincentivization and pre-commitment for a range of values of and q.
Consider "rst the impact of a change in q. A striking property that holds in the "rst panel, and also for other values of that we examine, is that for each "xed , the equilibrium values < 0 and < ! to the principal under the two regimes each Table 4 The e!ect of background risk on equilibrium outcomes
This table describes the structure of equilibrium payo!s and actions under both pre-commitment and resetting under the speci"cations of Section 7.3. The base parameters are "xed at H" 1.20,¸"0.833, and a "0.9 . The parameters and q denote, respectively, the directional impact of background noise and the measure of managerial in#uence to background noise in generating outcomes. The cost parameter is taken to be k"0.02. The subscripts R and C refer to &reincentivization' and &pre-commitment', respectively; < and ; are, respectively, the principal's and manager's expected utilities in equilibrium; is the size of initial option award; and is the size of the reset award under reincentivization. The "rst panel in the decrease monotonically as q increases. (This is true even for very high values of , e.g., "0.95, so the e!ect of the external factors is positive with a very high likelihood.) Of greater interest from the point of view of this paper, the second panel shows that the diwerence (< 0 !< ! ), which measures the relative optimality of resetting, also declines monotonically as q increases.
Both features have a common explanation. As a measure of the in#uence of factors beyond the manager's direct control, q measures, in a sense, the &back-ground risk' faced by the manager. An increase in the level of this risk makes it more di$cult for the principal to appropriately incentivize the manager. In the upper panel of Table 4 , for example, the number of options awarded the agent, both initially and at reset time (under reincentivization), increases with q. On the one hand, this makes resetting less pro"table in the continuation; on the other, the greater continuation awards also carry a potentially larger feedback e!ect. On both counts, the relative optimality of resetting declines as q increases.
Turning now to behavior in , the second panel in Table 4 again exhibits a strong monotonicity property: the di!erence (< 0 !< ! ) declines as increases, indicating that resetting becomes less relatively optimal as the impact of external factors becomes more positive. (It is also true, though the table does not show this, that for each "xed value of q, < 0 and < ! are both increasing in .) These are intuitive properties. Ceteris paribus, as increases, resetting is less pro"table in the continuation, since the manager's incentive to work is reduced at the margin; the feedback e!ect is also larger as the manager bene"ts from the added positive impact of the external noise. Thus, pre-commitment strategies become relative more attractive.
More general compensation structures
The analysis in this paper has been conducted on the basis that the only compensation instruments used by the principal are (analogs of) at-the-money call options on the "rm's terminal equity value. This condition might appear restrictive, but it is conceptually quite unimportant. The central point underlying our analysis is that allowing for interim renegotiation of contract terms will, in general, create greater sensitivity to observed histories } or path-dependence } in "nal payo!s, but will also have the e!ect of weakening initial incentives. Focusing on options as the sole instruments of compensation enables us to capture the tension between these forces in a particularly stark manner. However, adding other commonly used methods of compensation does not change the substance of our results. Consider equity, for example. Under pre-commitment, any initial award of equity has a "nal value that is independent of the path taken to reach that value; in our model, for instance, the value of any initial award of equity is the same at the "nal nodes H¸and¸H. On the other hand, allowing for interim rewriting of the contract terms (in particular, allowing the size of the grant to be altered) introduces greater #exibility into the "nal payo!s. Of course, to the extent it is anticipated, it also weakens initial incentives. This is exactly the tradeo! we study in this paper.
Indeed, it is apparent that the only general case in which this tradeo! is irrelevant is when resetting fails to expand the set of potential "nal payo! pro"les, i.e., when the principal already has the ability to write contracts of arbitrary complexity that can be contingent on interim events in "ne ways. In such a situation, of course, pre-commitment can never be worse than resetting: one available alternative for the principal is to commit to the payo! pro"le that would be realized under resetting, thereby creating the same initial and interim incentives for the manager as resetting. The converse, however, is false. Under pre-commitment, the principal can commit to ine$cient continuations from some interim states (in the interests of generating appropriate initial incentives), but under resetting such an o!er fails to be credible, since the manager will correctly anticipate that the contract terms will be amended at the relevant nodes.
We do not "nd compelling a case in which the principal has such unrestricted contracting ability. It is well known that in such circumstances, theoretically optimal contracts will typically depend on observed histories in very "ne and complex ways. In contrast, long-term compensation instruments used in practice (such as options) overwhelmingly tend to be path-independent; indeed, it is this very feature that necessitates resetting to realign incentives. A second consideration that also argues against allowing for unlimited contracting ability (pointed out by this paper's referee) is simply that contracting is a costly procedure. It is too expensive to anticipate and initially contract for all conceivable future states. All of this suggests that it is true but irrelevant that with instruments of unlimited complexity, shareholder value cannot be enhanced by resetting contracts at any point. However, it is both relevant and of interest to ask } as we have done in this paper } whether, given that instruments of limited complexity are used to set compensation, it could be optimal to agree to amend the terms of the original contract in some contingencies.
Conclusion
It has become commonplace in recent years for "rms that experience a decline in share prices to reduce the strike price on previously awarded stock option grants in an attempt to bring them closer to the money. Reaction to this practice in the "nancial press and from large institutional investors has been almost wholly negative. Yet surprisingly, the possible optimality and incentive e!ects of &resetting' have not been addressed in a contracting model in the literature on executive compensation. This paper describes a model for this purpose.
We "nd that although the anticipation of resetting weakens incentives present in the original award (the most common criticism of this practice), resetting can nonetheless be a value-enhancing strategy for "rms to employ, even in an ex-ante sense. In a comparison of natural benchmarks, we "nd that under robust conditions, the strategy that pre-commits to no resetting can be strictly dominated by the polar opposite strategy of reincentivization which resets optimally for the continuation whenever this is pro"table. Using a more general class of strategies, we show, moreover, that some degree of resetting is always optimal in all cases. This remains true even if managers can adversely in#uence the resetting process and cause &too much' resetting to occur, except when a combination of restrictive circumstances holds. In summary, our results indicate that the case against resetting is quite weak.
We also show that the nature of the tradeo!s we study is essentially unchanged if we extend the model to allow either party to sever the relationship in the interim. Finally, we also examine a commonly cited defense of resetting as necessitated by a decline in share prices due to &factors beyond the manager's control'. We "nd that although resetting can continue to be important even when external factors play a role in determining the return distribution, it becomes relatively less optimal as the role of the manager diminishes relative to these factors. In particular, resetting is most likely to be important when the manager's actions have a large impact on "nal outcomes. This last point o!ers a possible rationalization of the greater frequency of resetting empirically documented among smaller "rms.
Finally, we note that the framework we develop here has analogies to a number of other settings in "nancial economics as well. Of particular interest is the design of bankruptcy procedures. On the one hand, bankruptcy systems that encourage renegotiation between the concerned parties (as in the U.S.) are akin to the situation in which the option is reset contingent on a bad outcome being realized. Such systems have the advantage that continuation values are e$ciently realized, but they have an evident feedback e!ect that could increase the probabilities of bankruptcies occurring. On the other hand, insolvency codes that e!ectively precipitate liquidation of the "rm under bankruptcy (as in Germany) are analogous to pre-commitment strategies that eliminate renegotiation possibilities or at least make them very di$cult. This leads to potentially ine$cient continuations but can have a bene"cial feedback e!ect that lowers the occurrence of bankruptcies.
Appendix A. Equilibrium in the model of Section 4.2
A.1. Equilibrium under pre-commitment
Let be the number of call options (each with a strike of unity) awarded the agent at time 0. Contingent upon reaching the node H, the agent solves max ?Z ?
This has the solution
Thus, the agent's and principal's continuation utilities ; F ( ) and < F ( ) from the node H are given by
At node¸, the options are guaranteed to "nish out of the money, so we trivially have a J "; J "0 and < J "¸. At the initial node, now, the agent solves
Using ; J "0, the optimal "rst-period action for the agent is
Taking into account the agent's optimal response (A.1)}(A.4) to an initial o!er of , the principal now picks to maximize his initial expected utility:
Our goal is to identify the value of that solves (A.5). For notational simplicity, we will suppress dependence on in what follows below. There are four possibilities that could be induced by in equilibrium:
(a , and (iv) a F "a"a . We look at each of these in turn to see if such equilibria exist.
Case 1: a F (a , a(a . The inequalities a F (a and a(a can hold only if a F " (H!1)/k and a"; F /k. Of course, for these to hold, must, in turn, satisfy (a k/(H!1) and ; F ( )(a k. We will assume for the moment that satis"es these conditions, solve for the optimal value of , and see whether our assumptions are justi"ed at this optimal value. If so, the solution quali"es as a candidate equilibrium initial o!er; if not, equilibria of this form evidently do not exist.
Under the presumed hypotheses, we have ; F " (H!1)/2k and < Since we are assuming the interior solution for a, we have a"; F /k. Using this, we seek the value of that maximizes (A.5). The solution is easily seen to be Once again, this solution is discarded if it violates either of the presumed hypotheses that 'ka /(H!1) or ; F )a k. Case 4: a F "a , a"a . Now, we must have *a k/(H!1) and ; F *a k. It is apparent that, in this case, it is in the principal's interest to choose the smallest value of that guarantees these outcomes; this value is " k(2#a ) 2(H!1) . (A.10)
Having identi"ed potential solutions of all four forms, it is now a trivial matter, given any set of values for the parameters H,¸, a , and k, to identify the set of candidate solutions. Comparison of the value of the objective function at these solutions (and at the point "0) establishes the optimal value of under pre-commitment. ᮀ
A.2. Equilibrium under reincentivization
When reincentivization is possible, equilibria are a little harder to identify because of the possibility of the constrained resetting at H and¸. We proceed in three steps. First, we identify the equilibrium resetting at¸. We then identify the problem whose solution yields the equilibrium initial o!er in this problem, taking into account the possibility of resetting at both H and¸. Finally, we discuss deriving the solution to this problem.
Step 1 (Equilibrium resetting at¸): For any value of the initial o!er , the initial options are worthless at¸. Thus, if no resetting of the initial contract is made, the agent's optimal response in the continuation is a J "; J "0, which gives the principal a continuation utility of < J "¸. However, if a new award of at-themoney options is made, then the agent solves max ?Z ? +a (H¸!¸)! ka,.
This has the solution a J ( )"min+a , (H¸!¸)/k,. The equilibrium reset contract is the one that maximizes the principal's continuation utility from¸: We must also ensure that )1. This is satis"ed whenever a k)(H¸!¸), an assumption we make here and in our numerical calculations in Table 2 . As a consequence, the continuation values ; J and < J for the principal and agent are given by Note that in the "rst case, when¸(H!¸))2a k, it is clearly optimal to reset the contract at¸since the continuation value is strictly larger than¸; this also holds in the second case provided¸(H!¸)'ka . In what follows, we continue with only the "rst case. The second is easily handled analogously.
Step 2 (Equilibrium initial ower H). Pick any value of and de"ne the continuation action a F ( ) and the continuation values ; F ( ) and < In words, H is the principal's optimal initial o!er if resetting will occur at¸but not at H. Of course, the principal cannot commit himself a priori not to reset at H. Nonetheless, we will show that (i) H is an optimal initial o!er to make under resetting and (ii) if a( H)'0, then there will be no resetting at the node H under the o!er H. The following lemma will help establish these claims.
Lemma A.1. In any solution to (A.14) , it is the case that either a( H)"0 or < F ( H)*< J .
Proof. Suppose we had a( H)'0 and < F ( H)(< J . Then, of course, we must have
Now, the principal can always achieve the value < J in (A.14) by using "0, since this guarantees that the agent's "rst period action will be a"0. Together with (A.15), this implies H cannot maximize (A.14), a contradiction. ᮀ We return to the proof of the claim. We will "rst show that if the initial o!er H is made and a( H)'0, then it cannot be optimal to reset at H. Suppose to the contrary that under these conditions, a Pareto-improving continuation exists from H that leaves the principal strictly better o!. For speci"city, suppose this continuation involves issuing new options each with a strike of H to replace the existing H options. We will show that this means H does not solve (A.14), a contradiction.
Let ; F ( ) and < F ( ) represent the continuation payo!s from H under . By hypothesis, ; F ( )*; F ( H) and < F ( )'< F ( H). Now consider the e!ect of setting " H/(H#1) in (A.14). Under , the payo!s to the agent and the principal at the nodes H and H¸are the same as under ; therefore, we must have ; F ( )"; F ( ) and < F ( )"< F ( ), and this implies in turn
The "rst inequality states that the o!er does not decrease the &spread' (; F !; J ), and so from (A.13) the action a( ) it induces must satisfy a( )*a( H). Combining this with the second inequality and the inequality < F ( H)*< J (which must hold by Lemma A.1), we have a( )< F ( )#(1!a( ))< J 'a( H)< F ( H)#(1!a( H))< J .
But this means does better than H in (A.14), a contradiction. This completes the proof that resetting cannot be optimal at H if the initial o!er is H. Finally, suppose that H is not an optimal initial o!er under resetting; speci"cally, suppose there is another initial o!er ( that does strictly better. Then, ( must involve resetting at H; if it did not, it could not do better than H, since H solves (A.14). Let the resetting at H be at-the-money options. De"ne ; F ( ) and < F ( ) as earlier, and denote by a( ) the "rst period action induced by . Note that the initial expected utility of the principal under ( is then [a( )< F ( )#(1!a( ))< J ], which, by hypothesis, is strictly larger than a( H)< F ( H)#(1!a( H))< J . Consider now setting " H/(H#1) in (A.14). This o!er induces the same endgame payo!s as at the nodes H and H¸, so we clearly have ; F ( )"; F ( ) and < F ( )"< F ( ); as a consequence, a( )"a( ). Summing up, a( )< F ( )#(1!a( ))< J "a( )< F ( )#(1!a( ))< J .
But this means does better than H in (A.14), contradicting the de"nition of the latter. This establishes the claim.
Step 3 (Solving for the optimal initial ower H): To solve for H, we must solve (A.14). This is completely analogous to the procedure for solving for the pre-commitment equilibrium in (A.5). There are again four cases to consider where H induces (i) a F (a , a(a , (ii) a F (a , a"a , (iii) a F "a , a(a , and (iv) a F "a"a . The derivation of potential equilibria of each sort may be carried out as earlier. For example, it can be veri"ed that if an equilibrium H exists that induces a F (a and a(a , then H must satisfy the equation (Once again, of course, to qualify as a candidate solution, it must be veri"ed that H so de"ned meets the assumptions under which it was derived.) Proceeding as we did earlier, we identify all the possible solutions. Comparison of the value of the objective function at all feasible candidate solutions then delivers the equilibrium.
